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NOTES

both the advising attorney and the testator when questions arise regarding
implied revocations. No revocation should be permitted except on such
grounds as are specifically named in the statutes and these grounds should
be as few as possible.
RICHARD

A.

TOBIN

SOME ASPECTS OF THE LAW OF FIXTURES IN WYOMING
Fixtures are chattels annexed to real property which retain their
separate identity and become realty, but which under certain circumstances
may become personalty again.' Generally the annexation is in permanent
form and the chattel becomes an integral part of the real estate. However,
physical permanency is not always required to allow the chattel to become
2
a part of the realty.

Although the first paragraph above will serve the purpose of a broad
general statement it would be well to consider a quote from a 1931
Nebraska case: 3 "Perhaps there are no subjects in law more difficult to
deal with than the questions raised as to fixtures ....

The cases are legion;

and each new case seems only the more to disturb any fixed or certain
rule that seemed deductible from former cases." Fixtures are not exclusively a landlord-tenant problem but can also arise in controversies
between heir and executor; owner and his vendee; owner and mortgagee;
owner 'and trespasser; and owner or mortgagee and a conditional vendor.
The rule of the common law was that whatever is once annexed to the
freehold becomes part of it and cannot be removed except by the party
entitled to the inheritance. 4 This rule was never strictly followed in
America, and the following tests were laid down in an early American case
to determine whether the property be a fixture or not:5
1. Actual annexation to the realty, or something appurtenant thereto.
2. Appropriation to the use or purpose of that part of the realty with
which it is connected.

3. The intention of the party making the annexation, to make the
article a permanent accession to the freehold-this intention being
inferred from the nature of the article affixed, the relation and
situation of the party making the annexation, and the purpose or
use for which the annexation has been made.
But no precise rule can be laid down which will govern all cases as to
whether it is a chattel or a fixture. This can vary with the intention of
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Frost v. Schinkel, 121 Neb. 784, 238 N.W. 659, 77 A.L.R. 1381 (1931).
Teaff v. Hewitt, 1 Ohio St. 511, 59 Am.Dec. 634 (1851).
Frost v. Schinkel, 121 Neb. 784, 238 N.W. 659, 77 A.L.R. 1381 (1931).
Van Ness v. Pacard, 2 Pet. 137.
Teaff v. Hewitt, 1 Ohio St. 511, 59 Am.Dec. 634 (1851).
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the parties' and the different relationships of the parties. 6 Also, special
agreement of the parties will change the result obtained by application of
7
the tests.
An important and early exception to the rule of the common law that
whatever is once annexed to the freehold becomes part of it, exists in the
case of trade fixtures., Trade fixtures are articles annexed to the realty
by a tenant for the purpose of carrying on a trade or business and are
ordinarily removable by him while he is in possession of the freehold, and
such trade fixtures can be taken to pieces or even wrecked in removal,
but such removal must never cause substantial damage to the freehold.9
The reason for this property remaining personal is that the landlord
contributes nothing thereto and should not be enriched at the expense of
his tenant. 10 Further reasoning is that the erection of trade fixtures will
encourage trade and industry. 1
The three cases decided by the Wyoming Supreme Court, two of
which will first be considered together and referred to by the year of the
case 12 K- 13, will show the limitations reached in cases involving trade
fixtures in this state. The two cases are considered together because they
involve the same parties and facts and the results obtained in two different
appeals.
In the 1928 case a lease and construction agreement between landlord
and tenant had specified what property put upon the premises by the
lessee could be removed upon termination of the lease. Subsequently a
chattel mortgage was given by the lessee as to the materials purchased in
making the improvements called for in the construction agreement, and
the chattel mortagee later received an assignment of the lease from the
lessee. Such chattel mortgage professed to cover all the personal property
within the theatre building. The controversy concerned property removed
from the building by the chattel mortgagee as opposed to the rights of the
lessor to the same property under the lease and construction agreement as
construed together by the court. The court held that the chattel mortgagee obtained by assignment only those rights which the lessee had under
the lease and construction agreement, and therefore could remove only
such property as was allowed by such agreement. Anything removed not
covered by said lease and agreement would be controlled by the general
law of fixtures, regard being had particularly to trade fixtures.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
II.
12.
13.

Walker v. Tillis, 188 Ala. 313, 66 So. 54, L.R.A. 1915A, 654 (1914).
Valdes v. Central Altagracia, 225 U.S. 58, 56 L.Ed. 980, 32 S.Ct. 664 (1912).
Cameron v. Oakland County Gas and Oil Co., 277 Mich. 442, 269 N.W. 227, 107
A.L.R. 1142 (1936).
Frost v. Schinkel, 121 Neb. 784, 238 N.W. 659, 77 A.L.R. 1381 (1931).
Cameron v. Oakland County Gas and Oil Co., 277 Mich. 442, 269 N.W. 227, 107
A.L.R. 1142 (1936).
Standard Oil Co. v. LaCrosse Super Auto Service, 217 Wis. 237, 258 N.W. 791, 99
A.L.R. 60 (1935).
Slane v. Curtis, 39 Wyo. 1, 269 Pac. 31 (1928).
Slane v. Curtis, 41 Wyo. 402, 286 Pac. 372 (1930).
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In the 1930 case, an appeal from the judgment of the District Court as
to damages, the court considered, in addition to the proper measure of
damages, the nature of property removed by the chattel mortgagee not
covered by the lease and agreement, in particular doors and windows,
including transoms and transom glasses. They refused to sustain the
contention of the chattel mortgagee that this property was trade fixtures,
pointing out that the articles removed were those put in to take the place
of others already affixed, and since the old doors and windows, including
transoms and glasses, had not been replaced, the effect of the removal of
these substituted fixtures would be to leave the premises in a "maimed
condition," contrary to the lease agreement whereby the premises were to
be returned in the same condition as when leased, ordinary wear and tear
excepted. The court also approved that doors and windows, including
transoms, are ordinarily a part of the realty and cannot be removed by the
lessee. By the use of the word "ordinarily," the court might indicate that
custom and usage in a given jurisdiction could control upon this matter.
In the third case aforementioned, 14 involving a dispute between a
lessor and lessee over title to a building located upon the premises, the
court again decided against the lessee as to the property being a trade
fixture. Recognizing the general exception of trade fixtures they stated
there were certain restrictions upon the right of removal by the lessee.
Here, the lessee had used a building upon the premises, which was property
owned by the lessor, to construct a new building adapted for use in the
operation of a filling station. That is, he had stripped the old building
to its four walls and from this basis constructed the new building. Upon
termination of the lease the lessee wished to remove such structure as a
trade fixture. Refusing to allow removal the court stated the following:
(1) The lessee cannot remove the property as a trade fixture if he has
substituted his fixture for one which was there when he took possession
and this latter fixture has been injured or permanently removed, (2) He
cannot remove the property as a trade fixture if it is so annexed to the
realty as to be an integral part of the premises. Again the court pointed
out that the lease required the lessee to return the premises as received
"excepting only loss by fire, inevitabl accident or ordinary wear." The
new part of the structure could not be removed without material injury
even to the part of the old building incorporated, and if the new portion
were removed neither part would be an integral building.
From the foregoing cases decided by the Wyoming Court it appears:
(1) Trade fixtures are a recognized exception to the general rule of
annexation; (2) The parties may by special agreement specify that property which may be removed by the lessee upon termination of the lease;
(3) The person claiming such property as a trade fixture will not be
allowed the right of removal of the substituted fixture if the original
fixture has been rendered such as to make necessary the return of the
14.

Rosenblum v. Terry Carpenter, 62 Wyo. 417, 174 P.2d 142 (1946).
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premises in that status which is called a "maimed condition"; (4) The
alleged, trade fixture cannot be removed if it is so annexed to the realty so as
to be an integral part of the premises; (5) Doors and windows, including
transoms and glasses are ordinarily a part of the realty and cannot be
removed by the lessee.
Priorities as concerns a prior real estate mortagee and a subsequent
conditional seller were considered in a 1933 case decided by the Wyoming
court. 15 The action was replevin to recover a furnace which had been
installed by the conditional vendor while there was a prior mortgage on

the premises. The vendor and vendee (mortgagor) had entered into an
agreement whereby the furnace was to remain personal property until paid
for by the vendee. Upon the mortgagor giving a deed to -the mortgagee to
avoid foreclosure, the mortgagee claimed the furnace as a fixture. Indicating they were following the majority rule, the court held that the
conditional vendor could remove the furnace as personal property.

The

reasoning is that as the mortgage is merely security, the prior mortgagee
has advanced nothing in reliance on the value of the subsequently annexed
chattel, and he should not be permitted to acquire such a part of his
security contrary to the intent of the annexing party and to the injury
of the conditional vendor. The chattel cannot be removed, however, if
will substantially damage the premises. This ruling is opposed by the
so-called Massachusetts rule which holds that all fixtures are covered by
the real mortgage and it cannot be changed by a subsequent agreement to
which the mortgagee is not a party. 16 The furnace was set upon a cement
base and held in place by its own weight, and the testimony showed that
the furnace could be removed without substantial injury to the premises.
This action also determined that the legal rights arising from the
removal of the old furnace could not be litigated in the action of replevin,
as set-offs are not permitted. The removal of the old furnace did, however,
impair the mortagee's security, and this case recognizes that he should have
his remedy. This would be true even though the conditional vendor had
placed in the house registers, piping, and other fixtures impractical to be
removed without injury to the premises. The case shows that the conditional vendor would have the right to remove the furnace regardless
of the fact that accessories such as registers, piping, etc., could not be
removed without injury to the premises. The mortgagee could reap whatever benefit was bestowed upon the premises by the conditional vendor
in preparing the premises for use of the new furnace.
Although not decided by the Court it has been held in some jurisdictions that a subsequent real mortgagee will prevail over a prior conditional
seller, even though the chattel mortgage has been recorded, because the
real mortgagee gets no notice in searching the real records books, and he
15.

Holland Furance Co. v. Bird, 45 Wyo. 471, 21 P.2d 825 (1933).

16.

Meagher v. Hayes, 152 Mass. 288, 25 N.E. 105, 23 An.St.Rep. 819 (1890).
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is not required by law to search the chattel mortgage books. 17 The real
mortgagee has advanced something in relying on the value of the property
and in the absence of personal notice will prevail.
An interesting case decided in 1952 held that the parties to a sale
and mortgage can affix a real property status to chattels which are not
physically attached to the real property and are ordinarily thought of as
The sale and mortagage
personal property and not real property.'S
with
all improvements, water
together
Cabin
Club,
Log
covered a certain
fixtures
and stocks of liquor,
and
rights, appurtenances, and all equipment
The seller-mortbelonging
thereto.
therein
or
beverages, tobaccos, etc.,
gagee later had to foreclose the mortgage given by the buyer-mortgagor
and bought the property as a whole at the foreclosure sale. The mortgagor contended the so-called personal property was not legally sold under
the sheriff's sale of the real property, as the notice should have stated the
amount due on the personal property separately from that due on the
real property. After noting that the warranty deed of sale as well as the
mortgage purported to convey nothing except real property and the
appurtenances thereto, the court stated that the separation in the notice
of sale could not have been done as the mortgage secured one individual
indebtedness. A foreclosure of the mortgage and purchase by the mortgagee
would include the personal as well as the real property as the parties
intended such. The parties can fix the character of the property and
the law will enforce it so long as third parties will not be prejudiced.
The above holding should be confined to the facts and circumstances
of the particular case as is so often true in fixture cases. The court pointed
out that the parties were allowed to treat liquors, tobaccos, etc., as real
property under the mortgage, and the mortgage could be forcelosed and
a sale had selling the aforementioned articles as part of the realty as per
agreement of the parties. It was further noted that this holding would
not appear to harm public policy in any manner. Although this case
would appear from the nature of the personalty involved to be contrary to
the general rule of fixtures in that there is no physical permanency to the
annexation, such is not always required as aforementioned in this article.
In the Wyoming cases discussed herein the facts and circumstances
of each case have been a strong determinant in the holdings. The court
has upheld written agreements between the parties, of course with regard
to the relationship of those parties, which is always of prime concern in a
fixture case. The cases would show that the lease agreement is strictly
upheld with emphasis upon the tenant returning the premises as he received them, excepting ordinary wear and tear. The tenant will not be
allowed to make substitutions and then remove these substitutions as trade
fixtures without replacing the original fixture, as such removal would
impair the security of the landlord. Conditional vendors will be protected
17.
18.

Eliott A. Hudson, 18 Cal. 642, 124 Pac. 103 (1912).
Hill v. Salmon, 69 Vyo. 1, 236 P.2d 518 (1952).
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in their agreements with the mortgagor of premises as against a prior
mortgagor so long as removal does not do substantial damage to the
premises. And parties to a sale and mortgage may agree to make whatever
personality is included in the mortgage real property for the purpose of
the mortgage.
MYRON HOWARD

LIABILITY OF CHIROPRACTORS FOR MALPRACTICE
Since the days of Hippocrates, there has been a constant struggle
between the "regular" and "non-regular" medical practitioners. The
rivalry which exists today between regular physicians and surgeons and the
osteopath, the chiropractor, the naturopath, the Christian Science healer,
the clairvoyant physician, and those of various other schools of healing is
but a repetition of the rivalry between the allopath and the homeopath,
the physio-medic, the eclectic, and the botanic physicians of 175 years ago.'
Since the founding of the American School of Osteopathy by Dr. A. T. Still
in Kansas in 1872 and the school of chiropractic by D. D. Palmer in Iowa
in 1894 these two healing schools have steadily intruded themselves into
the field of medicine.2 Many legislatures have felt that such schools
have a place in the modern art of healing, and now every state in the Union
and the District of Columbia provide for the licensing of osteopaths, and
all except Louisiana, Mississippi, New York, Massachusetts and Texas provide for the licensing of chiropractors as such. 3
This article will be limited to a discussion of the liability of chiropractors in malpractice actions for failures in the diagnosis or treatment of
serious disorders such as diphtheria, diabetes, heart conditions and fractures, and also cases of alleged malpractice in the treatment of sore backs,
dislocated vertebrae and similar disorders which are usually considered
by the public as within the field of chiropractic practice. The article will
be directed mainly to the standard of care of the chiropractor but will
include some other aspects of the broader question of liability for malpractice. The liability of members of other schools of drugless healing
will be only incidentally considered. The question of the liability of a
chiropractor acting as an operator of an X-ray machine presents special
problems and will not be discussed.
1.

2.

3.

In Fishbein, The New Medical Follies (1927), there is listed in Chapter I, An
Encylopedia of Cults and Quackeries, an alphabetical list of cults numbering sixtythree, from "aerotherapy" to "zodiac therapy." Since the publication of that book
numerous other cults have appeared. See also, Caldwell, Early Legislation Regulat(1923).
ing the Practice of Medicine, 18 Ill. L. Rev. 225
In Reed, The Healing Cults (A. M. A. pamphlet, 1932) it is stated that the A. M. A.
Committee on the Costs of Medical Care estimated that as of 1932, in the United
States as a whole, for every ten physicians there was one chiropractor. Wyoming
had one chiropractor for every two physicians, for the highest ratio; and Wyoming
was second only to California in the ratio of chiropractors to population. In Boyd,
The Cult of Chiropractic (1953), published by the Louisiana State Medical Society,
it is estimated that in 1952 there were 20,000 chiropractors in the United States.
Memorandum, Bureau of Legal Medicine and Legislation, American Medical
Association (1950).

